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 Local government has a key problem in reconnecting with local voters and restoring its electoral legitimacy, as the recent Government White Paper acknowleges. Problems of one-party dominance, lack of effective opposition, local corruption and malversation can be traced in part to the ‘first-past-the-post’ (FPTP) electoral system. The government is proposing new voting systems for executive mayors, to ensure that they have a majority of local citizens’ support. But elections for councils also badly need reform, to produce more proportional results, increase electoral competition in local politics and strengthen opposition in one-party controlled areas (one in five localities). Many councillors in the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties back a thorough-going reform of local voting as a key step needed to restore the political fortunes and electoral legitimacy of local government.

 To research how alternative electoral systems would work in the very different kinds of local authorities across England we re-analysed two 1990s elections in 12 different localities, covering major cities, big towns, London boroughs, county councils and rural districts. We simulated outcomes in 96 different elections, producing the most authoritative picture ever compiled of how electoral reform would work in local government.

 The alternative vote (AV) or the supplementary vote (SV) on their own would guarantee that all councillors had majority support in their wards, and could be implemented without changing ward boundaries. But our research shows that they would do nothing at all to curb disproportionalities between parties’ vote shares and seat shares, or to treat opposition parties more fairly in one-party areas. However, these systems are highly suitable for electing executive Mayors, since they will produce local leaders with clear majority support. The supplementary vote (SV) has several advantages over AV for Mayoral elections, in preserving party discipline, producing simpler ballot papers, retaining ‘X’ voting, being more consistent with systems used to elect councillors, and avoiding situations where Mayors are elected with 50.1% support.






 The Single Transferable Vote (STV) would use the same kind of wards as List PR, again posing severe problems if annual elections are introduced, as the Labour government intends. Our findings show that the system would generally produce proportional outcomes, but in a fair number of cases we examined STV produced apparently anomalous results. The system would create a great deal of voter choice, recording multiple preferences within or across party slates of candidates in a sophisticated way. But it might tend to be unfavourable for Independents, who would have few incentives to form lists but who would find it harder to campaign in large wards. The Liberal Democrats support the introduction of this system, but Labour has generally opposed it. It is not used anywhere in the UK outside Northern Ireland.

 The Additional Member System (AMS) entails electing half or more of councillors from single-member local wards, with the remaining councillors being chosen by a top-up mechanism to represent wider areas (typically covering an area served by around 15 current councillors). The top-up members are chosen using a list PR method so as to compensate parties with many votes who are unrepresented in the local ward contests. In our findings AMS is far and away the most consistently accurate and proportional system, working in a very reliable way across all the local authority elections we analysed. AMS always delivers a very good match between parties’ vote shares and their numbers of councillors. The system will produce more hung councils than even List PR or STV, but it tends to encourage effective coalition working. It is already being used to elect the Greater London Assembly, the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh National Assembly. It has strong Labour backing and is acceptable to Liberal Democrats. It can be implemented more easily and preserves more local links for councillors than STV or List PR, especially if annual elections are introduced.





	PART 1: CURRENT DISCONTENTS WITH LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Electoral systems have strong consequences for many aspects of any liberal democratic political system. But it is important to recognize that they primarily affect the direct representation of citizens, the extent of party competition and the level of effective electoral accountability of councillors (and of mayors where they are elected). Just as we would not ask of a kettle that it should make toast as well, so we need to keep in mind a realistic view of what electoral systems or changes in electoral systems can do for local polities. Changing an electoral system cannot in itself rejuvenate local democracy, secure social balance amongst councillors in terms of gender or ethnicity or social class, improve local political leadership, make citizens spontaneously interested in local issues compared with national politics, or do 101 other desirable things which are sometimes claimed for it by over-enthusiastic proponents. What it can do, depending on the choice of system that is made, is to tackle directly and effectively some of the existing symptoms of long-run malaise in British local politics. Introducing new electoral arrangements can also perhaps set in train or strengthen wider political transformations which may address diverse other discontents as well, providing a lever with which other forces for change may find expression.
The main perceived problems for which electoral reform has been advocated in local government are:




In the present first past the post (FPTP) voting system for local councils there are two main sources of ‘deviation from proportionality’ (that is, mismatches between parties’ shares of the votes and their shares of council seats). First, FPTP elections (more accurately described as plurality rule) require only that a candidate get more votes than any other candidate in order to win a ward. There is no requirement for councillors to gain majority support before they are elected, only a plurality (more votes than anyone else). This system normally has a strong built-in tendency towards over-representing the leading party in a local authority. But sometimes (as we shall see below) it can instead exaggerate the seats won by a close-running second-placed party. Plurality rule has also very heavily penalized smaller parties which may win a great deal of support across the local authority area but cannot accumulate the most votes to win particular wards. Historically the bias of plurality rule or FPTP favoured both Labour and the Conservatives over the Liberal Democrats and (to a lesser degree the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales). But since the 1980s the Tories’ position in local government has worsened so much that outside their core areas they now derive much less benefit from plurality rule than in the past. It is now common to find that Conservatives are under-represented on local councils in conurbation areas and towns - that is, their seats share on the council is less than their votes share amongst the electorate. By contrast the Liberal Democrats have generally done better since the mid 1990s, and sometimes are proportionally treated. In their areas of strength they can even share some of the over-representation bias of the system. The nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales have also overcome disadvantages in their areas of concentrated strength. But all three parties are under-represented very widely elsewhere, as are the Greens and other minor parties everywhere.  
Second the warding system in local government characteristically exaggerates the bias of plurality rule, by carving the municipal area into electoral districts where typically the majority alignment across the local authority is again over-represented. This effect heavily benefits parties with the most spatially concentrated vote base, especially Labour and the Conservatives (again decreasingly since the 1980s). It discriminates against parties with more evenly spread votes (especially the Liberal Democrats). Lags in redistricting characteristically favour Labour in larger (whole city) authorities, since the party has strong support in inner city areas which have tended to lose population fastest.





A direct consequence of plurality rule and warding effects is that the vote shares won by parties and their seat shares in councils bear little relation to each other in very many instances. One party councils occur in situations where a single party with overall majority support in an area, or even a high minority support, manages to win every single seat (or all bar one or two seats) in a council. In the current political situation virtually all such authorities are controlled by the Labour party.  The key problem for local democracy here is that no organized opposition at all can be formed on the council. Hence the policies of the majority party simply cannot be subjected to effective scrutiny by anyone apart from the local media - for example, the current situation in Hull. Dominant party councils occur where a party with large minority support, or with less than this support but facing an evenly divided opposition, wins artificial majorities on the council, and controls the council from one term to the next with no viable prospect of the opposition ever displacing it. Councils highly insulated from electoral competition are those where the leading party in terms of votes derives a substantial extra protection from the disproportional effects of plurality rule and the warding system, such that although the electoral process is competitive in votes, the distribution of council seats is much less competitive. In one-party or dominant party councils there is in practice no chance or little chance of party alternation in control of committee chairs or council majorities. In highly insulated councils, a transition to no overall control may occur, or even party alternation in control of the council, but one or more parties derive additional electoral system protection and are shielded from the effects of unpopular policies. Work by Steve Leach of de Montford University has shown that just before the 1998 local elections in a fifth of all councils in England and Wales one party (usually Labour) controlled over 80 per cent of councillors. So the scale of these problems is quite extensive.

 Corruption, malversation, party factionalism and rancorous partisan politics. 
Corruption and malversation (unethical use of administrative power) concern cases of direct abuse in appropriating public monies, usually for individual purposes. Party factionalism involves the development of internal party feuds or sections, waging war on each other under the cover of a single party label - usually in conditions where there is a one-party council or a dominant party system. Rancorous partisan politics involves the devotion of public monies to overtly or implicitly partisan purposes: it occurs when a strong local political leadership seeks to exploit a temporary dominance of local electoral politics by enacting ‘preference-shaping’ policies so as to consolidate or make permanent its hegemony. These adverse but common features of local government tend to flourish in conditions where electoral competition is inhibited. Most adverse recent publicity in current political conditions has concerned Labour councils in provincial cities and in Scotland. But experience in London over the last 15 years shows that these problems can occur also in Conservative councils (like Westminster and Wandsworth) and Liberal Democrat councils (such as Tower Hamlets before 1994) where local leaders try ‘too hard’ to become insulated from electoral competition.





The problems of highly imperfect electoral systems, non-competitive councils and recurrent scandals and corruption in local politics have all contributed to a general erosion of the legitimacy of local government in the UK. In opinion polls British voters profess themselves more satisfied with local government’s performance than with that of many other institutions. For instance, in the run-up to the 1997 general election, satisfaction with Parliament declined sharply to just over a third of voters while satisfaction with local councils remained stable at around a half of voters. Yet during the 1980s and most of the 1990s there was little effective public opposition to reductions in councils’ powers. National politicians in this period saw little risk in imposing greater central controls - a pattern of response that has not greatly shifted under Labour ministers since 1997. Public opinion has also been divided about vesting new powers in local authorities under current conditions. 




The traditional UK system has been a ‘submerged executive’ where partisan control of councils is exercised via party group leaders (who may not be well-known figures in their locality, since they have few honorific functions), and via a diffuse executive of committee chairs (often effectively invisible to the public). This pattern does not help create local interest in elections. In addition, Britain currently has the fewest and the largest base units of local government of any west European country, a consequence of successive local government modernizations in the 1960s and 1970s. Many units of local government lack clear historic or geographic identities, and hence do not command strong popular or elite loyalties - notably in most of the London boroughs. Local councils are also perceived as powerless bodies, beholden to Whitehall, dependent on central finance, and unable to influence their local economies significantly (because of the unified business rate especially). Obviously a range of other institutional changes, such as the introduction of directly elected executive mayors and the decentralization of additional powers to local authorities, could be needed if many of these issues are to be tackled effectively. But electoral system changes could also play a key role here - in ensuring that both councils and elected mayors had stronger popular legitimacy. A reform could also demonstrate to central government that local authorities are now more responsive to local citizens’ views and are held accountable to them - hence they are worthy of being granted greater autonomy in their decision-making.










	PART 2: THE BASIC OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE WAY





Electoral systems depend on institutional structures.  So changing voting systems has historically been easier at times when major institutions are already in flux, either because established arrangements are perceived to be in crisis and in need of overall renewal, or because radically new structures are being put in place. Alternative electoral systems have entered into the British constitution so far mainly via the second route, with the ‘additional member system’ being enacted for the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and the Greater London Assembly. The London Mayor will be chosen by the first electoral system in mainland Britain to count voters’ second preferences as well as their first preferences, using a system called the ‘supplementary vote’. The adoption of a closed List PR system for Britain’s 1999 Euro-elections also reflected pressure for a common electoral system to be adopted across the EU countries for choosing the European Parliament, combined with dissatisfaction over two decades of stagnant turnout in Britain’s Euro-elections. From 1979 to 1994 the old plurality rule system attracted just over a third of citizens to the polls, the lowest turnout in Europe.
For local government the main reform options available can be considered as a sequence of choices to be made, beginning with those implying the most fundamental changes of institutional arrangements and then working through successively more specific decisions. The focus here is on how councillors come to occupy their seats, and we pose the following chain of questions:
  Should we consider alternative electoral systems to plurality rule? If not, then improving electoral accountability in local government comes down to ameliorating current electoral administration in incremental ways - as in the package of minor reforms currently being promoted by the Department of Environment, Transport and Regions, such as improving voter registration processes or extending the locations where polling stations are placed. We would expect that the cumulative effect of such changes on any of the problems discussed above in Part 1 will be negligible in both the short and long term, even if they are statutorily enforced. Hence we do not discuss them further. 





 Can changes be made away from all councillors representing local wards? The main principled Labour objections to electoral reform for the House of Commons have focused on the need for ‘strong and stable’ government which voters can identify as responsible for problems. Exponents of this view are staunchly against a new system which would lead to coalition governments making deals in ‘smoke-filled rooms’. Defenders of plurality rule also argue for ‘keeping the link’, the highly valued relationship between each MP and her or his local constituency. The first objection was dismissed as irrelevant to local government by Labour’s 1992 Plant Commission, who accepted that local councils were more ‘deliberative assemblies’ and hence perfectly appropriate bodies to be elected by PR. Nor has the development of many types of council with no overall control afforded any systematic or well-founded evidence of either improved or worsened local governance compared with one-party control. As with all councils there are some hung councils which have performed well and others worse. More consensual or majoritarian decisions often resulted, although sometimes the process of reaching agreement became somewhat more protracted. 




Retaining local wards on exactly the current pattern will imply a radical restriction of the electoral systems which can be considered. There are in fact only two voting methods which can be considered, both of which claim as their primary advantage that candidates can only get elected with majority support. They achieve this effect by counting voters’ second or subsequent preferences if no one candidate gains over 50 per cent of the vote, therefore also obviating any need for citizens to consider tactical voting:
 In the Supplementary Vote (SV) voters mark an X in a first preference column against their preferred candidate’s name, and then another X in a second preference column. First preferences are counted, and if one candidate has majority support they are elected straightaway. If no one has majority support, then only the top two candidates stay in the race. The third, fourth and subsequent candidates are eliminated in one go, and their voters’ second preferences are examined. Any second preferences for the two candidates still in the race are added to their first preferences piles, and whoever now has most votes wins. SV expands voters’ choice because supporters of third or fourth placed parties in a local area can still vote honestly on their first preferences, but can none the less also influence the eventual outcome, by casting a second vote for whichever of the viable local contenders they prefer. 








Neither AV nor SV are likely to do a great deal to bring about greater proportionality in local government elections. They would probably strengthen the links between local councillors and voters, and could increase the strength of party competition in all those many seats where councillors are elected with only minority support. We do not know how many councillors this applies to, but at Westminster in 1997 a record 301 out of 641 MPs in Great Britain (47 per cent) were elected with only minority support. Similar ratios of councillors enjoying less than minority support are feasible in local elections. But using SV and AV on their own cannot guarantee greater proportionality than at present. And in fact both systems may actively worsen disproportionality. In the 1992 general election at national level, Liberal Democrat voters split their second preferences fairly evenly with a net majority for the Conservatives. In these circumstance both SV and AV would have achieved a small improvement in proportionality for the House of Commons. But in the following 1997 general election, Liberal Democrat voters switched their second preferences to being strongly in favour of Labour. Here both SV and AV would have markedly worsened the national disproportionality score achieved under plurality rule. The already under-represented Tories would have seen their seats cut back from 165 MPs under plurality rule to just 110 MPs, and Labour’s already over-sized Commons majority would have been further boosted to 68 per cent of all seats on the basis of 44 per cent of the British vote (Dunleavy et al, 1997).  We do not yet have comparable data for local government, but we would be astonished if similar effects did not apply also at this level. Our interim conclusion would therefore be that changing to SV or AV would be very unlikely to address the most serious current problems reviewed in Part 1 of this paper. To achieve more effective reform will hence require that at least some councillors should be elected from areas larger than current local government wards.

 Is it important to retain the maximum number of local councillors in single-member local wards? If the answer is ‘Yes’, then the search for alternative electoral system would have to focus heavily on:




Under AMS voters get a ballot paper in two parts. The first section is essentially similar to the current ballot paper, and voters mark a first preference candidate (and party) with a single X. The second section gives only the party names, although it may also list the candidates that the party is including on its list in order - usually the same people who are standing for the party in local areas. Again voters mark a single X for their most preferred party. Local votes are counted first and each local seat is won by the party with most votes there, as now. The process then moves to allocating the top-up seats. Here the system essentially aims to compensate parties with numerous votes in the local seats contests but which have won no seats. The top-up seats are awarded so as to bring each party’s share of seats into line with its share of votes.
In existing AMS systems in Britain the local constituencies are quite large. They follow Westminster constituency boundaries in Scotland and Wales, and two-borough or three-borough areas in the London assembly. The top-up areas in Scotland and Wales are the old Euro-constituencies, bringing together between 7 and 11 Westminster constituencies. Each top-up area has 7 top-up MSPs per area in Scotland and 4 in Wales. In the capital the top-up area is Greater London as a whole, and there are 11 top-up seats, out of a total assembly of 25 seats. The total number of local plus top-up seats within each top-area has a technical significance because it determines how great a proportion of the total vote a party must obtain to secure representation. In Scotland this effective ‘threshold’ will be about 5 per cent of the vote, in Wales about 7 per cent, and in London about 4 per cent. 




There are also two other possible mixed electoral systems which operate in an identical way to AMS in having locally elected members topped up to give proportional outcomes. Their distinctive feature is that they use a majoritarian system for choosing the local representatives instead of plurality rule. This approach is called SV Plus if SV is used in local constituency contest and AV Plus if AV is used instead. The great advantage claimed for these systems is that every local representative now has majority support from her or his area, and voters no longer confront problems of tactical voting in these contests. Although neither system has yet been applied in Britain the Jenkins Commission recommended an AV Plus system as the alternative electoral method for choosing the House of Commons which will be put to voters in a referendum.

If it is not essential to get retain single-member wards in whole or in part for local authority elections, then the scope of viable electoral systems would be widened further to encompass List PR and STV, both of which achieve greater proportionality than plurality rule by grouping representatives into multi-member constituencies. If these two systems are to be proportional then the smallest electoral districts to be used must be four-member areas, and it would generally be preferable (especially in Scotland and Wales where four major parties contend for seats) to use five- or even six-member areas. We have assumed here and in our other work that at least five or six councillors will be elected from each of the larger wards, although four-seat wards are occasionally used where the numbers or layout of seats makes it unavoidable. In existing local government arrangements two or three-member wards are already very common wherever annual elections occur. So here five- or six-member areas could be created fairly easily by amalgamating a couple of existing wards. But in localities with all single-member wards still there would be a much larger increase in the geographical scale of ward areas.








Once we know how many seats each party should have, the simplest ‘closed list’ approach means that candidates are elected from each party in the order that they appear on its list, until its seats entitlement is filled.  This is the system used for the European Parliament elections in mainland Britain in June 1999.  It means that on their ballot papers voters only get a choice between rival party slates of candidates - they cannot influence the order in which candidates are elected from any particular party, which is set by the party selection processes. It is also possible to use an ‘open list’ PR version where voters get a slightly larger ballot paper and can choose either to mark their one X either against a complete party slate, or for a particular candidate in one slate. In a five-member ward approach would mean that voters would confront an open list ballot paper with around 15 to 20 candidate names on it (maybe more in Scotland and Wales). Again people cast only a single X vote, but at the seat allocation stage a somewhat more complex allocation process operates, which effectively moves a candidate with a lot of votes up their party’s list and makes it (somewhat) more likely that they will win one of that party’s seats. In a poll carried out in early 1998 we showed that well-designed ballot papers for both closed and open-list PR were popular with the public, and that neither system presented a problem for voters to understand or operate (Dunleavy, Margetts and Weir, 1998).

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is amongst the best-known alternative electoral systems in the UK, and has been used in Northern Ireland for European Parliament and Assembly elections. It differs from List PR in giving voters a more complex ballot paper listing all the candidates for each of the parties (again with around 20 names in England and 25 names in Scotland and Wales for a five-member constituency). Voters can cast multiple votes under STV, however, and not just one. They number candidates 1, 2, 3, 4 etc. in their order of preference, showing as many choices as they like and picking candidates in any order within a party or across different parties.  At the seat allocation stage a quota is defined, see above, and any candidate with enough personal votes to come up to quota is elected straightaway. Usually this phase will leave around half the seats still unallocated, however. And here the system switches into the AV method of eliminating bottom candidates and redistributing their voters’ second preferences to candidates still in the race. This elimination process continues until all candidates who could come up to quota have done so and all seats have been filled.




Critics argue that STV will erode party discipline, and may disrupt efforts by the main parties to field a balanced set of candidates in ethnic or gender terms (because prejudiced voters can also better express their views). It might also create intense competition between candidates of the same party to build up a personal vote base in the locality, which critics allege could have undesirable consequences in local government where corruption and doing favours for people may be more of a problem than in national British politics. (In post-war Italy and Japan different voting systems which encouraged candidates of the same party to compete with each other were often blamed for the maintenance of endemic corruption and clientelism: both countries changed their systems to eliminate this feature in the 1990s. In Ireland some commentators suggest that the STV system has encouraged clientelist practices and over-parochialism amongst Dail members, but there are few complaints at local government level).







 Looking across all the three proportional systems (AMS, List PR and STV), we can expect that their introduction would immediately tend to boost the number of councils susceptible to no overall control, and considerably increase the number of councils with strongly competitive elections. 
 All the PR systems would also tend to make more stable the local electoral fortunes of parties (in terms of councils won or total numbers of councillors) than they have been at times in the post-war period. Gains or losses of councillors and of councils would respond only to changes in vote shares, without plurality rule’s powerful exaggerative effects. 
 The likely spread of no overall control councils would imply an increased development of coalition administrations in local government, and a reduction in the minority administrations which sometimes occur at present.


	PART 3: ELECTING EXECUTIVE MAYORS





By contrast the more radical change of introducing a directly elected executive Mayor would give voters a chance to affect the local executive directly. And by creating a separation of powers between the Mayor and the council it could encourage councillors to do a more effective and independent-minded job of maintaining scrutiny of the authority’s policies and implementation, and representing their constituents views. This is the system adopted for the Greater London Authority. But in areas where local politics is already dominated by one party, combining a directly electing Mayor with a FPTP council will not give any real separation of powers, since the majority party will be certain of winning both the Mayorship and the vast majority of council seats. The fact that the Mayor must stand directly for election may still have some corrective impacts in increasing his or her accountability to voters. But experience in the United States also suggests that problems with ‘rogue’ mayors are also quite common, a serious problem unless the council has the ability and the electoral legitimacy to act as an effective check and balance on the Mayor’s behaviour. The Modern Local Government White Paper in March 1999 provides for a local referendum to be initiated by a petition of 5 per cent of local voters in order to consider creating a directly elected Mayor (to be elected by a majoritarian system as in London, which means SV or AV). Some local councils have hence begun considering introducing this change in advance of any such initiatives. It may be helpful for this process to review the rationale for the very much simpler range of electoral systems available for electing strong mayors with real executive powers.




If plurality rule is retained for electing a mayor at large (as in US cities), then a candidate may be elected with a proportion of the vote equal to 100 per cent divided by the number of effective mayoral candidates. Recall that plurality rule only requires that the winner have more votes than anyone else, but not that they have a majority. In the 1992 general election vote for the Inverness constituency there was a very evenly matched competition between four parties, and the winning MP was elected with just 26 per cent of the vote. A similar outcome could easily occur in British cities where the three main parties each field strong candidates and a prominent independent also runs, while in Scotland and Wales there are often four parties in contention already. (To see what might happen here, consider the case of the April 1999 election for the governorship of the Tokyo region - a key political position in Japan. Here a 19 candidate race was won under FPTP by a candidate with just 30 per cent of the vote). A mayor elected with a share of the vote less than 50 per cent is likely to be in a weaker negotiating and legitimacy position vis a vis an elected council, especially a council which is proportionally elected, and even more one where ‘opposition’ parties hold a majority of seats. By contrast, a mayor with over 50 per cent support would tend to have enhanced legitimacy in dealing with her council, even one which is proportionally elected. These considerations prompted Tony Blair and Labour ministers in late 1987 and early 1988 discussions to accept the need for a majoritarian system for electing the powerful London mayor.
The main European method for securing a mayor with majority support is the double ballot. Here citizens vote on two successive Sundays. In the first round of voting a large number of candidates stand, but then either some low-placed candidates are forced to drop out of the second round of voting a week late, either because their vote share falls below a certain threshold (such as 12.5 per cent) or because the second round is restricted to a run-off between the top two candidates. The double ballot option was ruled out by ministers for the London mayor because turnout levels would be likely to drop sharply on the second ballot. With existing participation levels in British local government elections already so low, the danger would be that turnout in week 2 would be catastrophically poor. We concur that a double ballot system would be impracticable under British conditions for the foreseeable future.




 AV does not recount the second or subsequent preferences of all voters for third, fourth or lower placed parties. It only looks at the ballots given to candidates who are being eliminated from the bottom. Hence in close two-party races, where one candidate has nearly got majority support already, AV may often deliver a very minimal majority for a mayor. For instance, in the 1997 general election Labour got 49.5 per cent of the vote in London, with the Tories running second. So on a 1997 votes basis a Labour candidate would have needed only a few extra votes from eliminated minor party candidates to gain an absolute majority for the mayorship. After this the AV counting process would stop, leaving the mayor with 50.1 per cent support. What might never become clear under AV is that the Labour candidate would also have got the second preferences of most Liberal Democrat voters, another 14 per cent support. By contrast, SV recounts the second preferences of all ballots cast for candidates placed third or lower. So the Liberal Democrats would have been eliminated from the run-off, and on the 1997 votes basis a Labour mayor would have been elected in London with 64 per cent of the vote - a much more impressive mandate. The same situation could recur in any city where the leading party has near-majority support, and where in addition to the three main parties there is some ‘other’ voting for minor or fringe parties.




 AV may tend to erode party discipline because dissident candidates from party A can stand, asking voters to vote first for them and second for party A’s official candidate. The dissident candidate may claim that their move does not fragment or damage party A’s total vote share, because if they are less successful than the mainstream party nominee their votes will transfer to that official candidate anyway. By contrast under SV only the top two candidates on first preferences can go into the run-off stage. So if party A’s vote is split between two candidates, then neither their official nor their dissident candidate may be in the top two on first preferences and they could lose out to the other (unsplit) parties. For instance, suppose that Labour has 40 per cent support in a locality, the Conservatives 32 per cent and the Liberal Democrats 26 per cent. If the Labour vote is split evenly between (say) official Labour and ‘black Labour’ candidates then the run-off becomes a Tory versus Liberal Democrat race. And since most Labour voters would mark a Liberal Democrat second preference they could win, despite running third on first preferences.
  If the Mayor and the local council are to be elected on the same day, as they are in London, then it is important for the ballot papers to be congruent with each other. In particular, both ballot paper should either use X voting or have voters use numerical ranking (marking 1, 2, 3 etc). Using SV for mayors is consistent with choosing either AMS (or other mixed systems) or List PR to elect local councils proportionally. SV is also compatible with using plurality rule or SV to elect councils un-proportionally. But an SV system for choosing mayors cannot be used in tandem with STV or AV for choosing councils. By contrast, adopting an AV system for choosing mayors is fully consistent only with using STV to elect councils proportionally, or with using AV to elect them un-proportionally. In London the choice of an AMS system for the Assembly suggested SV for the mayor.




In addition to SV and AV it is theoretically possible to consider a range of systems which could be called ‘modified AV’. The basic idea of these systems is to bridge between SV which allows voters to express only two preferences and lets only two candidates progress to the single run-off round, and AV which allows voters unlimited preferences and potentially almost as many recounts as candidates. Thus we might look at systems which let voters express three preferences and allow three candidates to go into two successive rounds of redistribution. Or we could allow voters’ four preferences and four candidates go into three successive elimination rounds. So far as we know, such systems are not in operation anywhere in the world, nor have they been used previously. But they are possible to design, were considered seriously by the Government Office for London in looking at the mayoral electoral system, and might have advantages - for instance, in local authorities where there is basically a four-party system, as in Scotland and Wales.
This having been said, we believe that the likely debate over electing executive mayors in Britain will probably come down to a choice essentially between the supplementary vote as applied in London, or the alternative vote, and plurality rule. SV has significant advantages, especially in achieving consistency between the ‘look and feel’ of mayoral elections and council elections under a non-STV proportional system


	PART 4: COMPARING THE PERFORMANCE OF 
	DIFFERENT SYSTEMS





Our approach here is very different - to focus on actually existing local elections in 12 localities in England and to re-run these elections in a simulation mode to show what would happen differently under the various alternative reforms. Simulations are an accepted part of modern political science methods, and our approach is based on the collection of data from two very large surveys carried out in 1992 and 1997, plus the re-analysis on computer of two datasets of  local election results from the early and mid 1990s for each of our areas. We were able to model how the parties’ shares of votes would have translated into council seats in each of the 12 areas under different electoral systems, and to project seats results for the councils.  Readers who are prepared to take our analysis on trust can simply read on, but those who are interested in learning in detail about the simulation methods used should turn to the Appendix on page 56 which provides a detailed description of what we did.
We had to cover so many different local areas because there is a great deal of variation in electoral arrangements across different parts of England - especially between county and district authorities, and between city and more rural authorities. In order to say something worthwhile about the scope for effecting changes in voting systems we therefore had to show how alternative electoral systems would work out under different warding arrangements and with different political situations. Our cases were chosen to span across a range of competitive party systems and dominant party systems, and they include examples of all the main patterns of current electoral arrangements. The local authorities included in the study are:
Elections analysed from the

Type of authority	Name	early 1990s	mid 1990s
















The three county councils in our study used single-member wards, as did Ashford (in all but four wards). The three district councils in rural areas had mixtures of three, two and single-member wards, with around half of wards and a third of councillors in single-member areas. The London boroughs and Birmingham and Hull all used either three member wards throughout, or a mix of three-member and two-member wards.
We look at the performance of the five systems reviewed here (SV, AV, AMS, List PR and STV) under the following eight headings, in roughly diminishing order of our ability to illuminate the issue from our analysis:
- Securing proportional outcomes
- Producing opposition and scrutiny of policy-making
- Getting the order of parties right
- Producing majorities or coalitions
- Ease of implementation within existing ward structures
- Maintaining ward links between councillors and constituents
 	- Treating independents fairly and 
- Thresholds for minor parties to win seats




It is important to stress also that the 12 authorities we have selected are not in any way a representative sample of all local authorities in England. Instead they are meant to provide only apt illustrations of a number of different institutional and political settings. Taken as a group our authorities include more ‘unusual’ cases (for instance, of one-party dominance or uncontested elections) than local authorities as a whole. Consequently the only legitimate use of the data we present is to compare between electoral systems for the particular set of local authorities selected for study. Where we succeed in establishing strong differences between electoral systems in our data set it will be likely that the same broad patterns would show up in local authorities as a whole, especially where our analysis illuminates the causal path that is operating to produce different patterns of results. But the precise numerical estimates in our data set are of value only in comparing between systems for these 12 authorities and 24 elections, and they do not show what would happen more broadly.

	[INSERT MAIN DATA TABLES ABOUT HERE]

Securing proportional outcomes




The DV statistic could theoretically fall to zero if an electoral system was perfectly proportional. In practice, however, there is often an effective minimum level of proportionality which is normally set by the size of the vote going to ‘other’ party candidates or to independents. Parties or candidates with tiny vote shares (under 2 per cent) are unlikely to secure seats under any electoral system, but with a number of ‘other’ parties or independents the total ‘other’ vote can easily mount up above 5 per cent. Whatever the total vote share going to very minor parties or candidates, that (in effect) will be the lowest feasible level of DV score. In our data set the independents were not minor in the three rural districts, but there was a Green party vote in East Lindsey. Across the 20 elections where we could compute the ‘other’ party vote then the average (median) level was 3 per cent, and in most localities the range was from just above zero (in Richmond) to 8 per cent. In Newham there was a 14 per cent vote for ‘other’ candidates in 1994 and 17 per cent in 1998, and in East Lindsey the Greens achieved a score as high as 9 per cent - but all these cases could be coped with satisfactorily by any proportional system. Thus a rule of thumb would be that the lowest feasible level of DV will be around 3 per cent.
Ideally the DV score should run from zero to 100 per cent as a maximum (or from 0 to 1 in decimal terms). But it does not do so in any liberal democracy because a DV score of 100 per cent could only be achieved if all seats on a council were allocated to a party which won no share of the votes at all - a result which we could hardly admit as a possible democratic outcome. The limiting case of a liberal democratic result is what actually occurred in the 1998 Newham election when Labour was the largest party with 58 per cent support and won every single council seat, following on from 1994 when it won all but one of the seats. This possibility, that whichever is the largest party wins all available seats, can be taken to define the maximum DV score which can occur in any council that we still regard as a liberal democratic body.
The maximum DV score under liberal democracy thus equals 100% minus the largest party’s vote share. We take advantage of this knowledge by computing a second measure of disproportionality, the adjusted DV score which is defined as:
(the DV score times 100) divided by (100 - largest party’s vote).
The adjusted DV score (ADV) measures how far the political system being studied is towards being maximally disproportional while still remaining any form of liberal democracy. Like the normal DV score its minimum is set theoretically at zero and in practice at around 3-4 per cent. But unlike the normal DV scores, the ADV figure has a maximum level of 100%, the ADV score achieved in Newham’s 1998 elections.








However, Figure 1 shows that all the other three systems would make a major difference to DV scores. For both List PR and Single Transferable Vote (STV) the average (median) DV score would drop from 22 under plurality rule to just a third of this level at 7 per cent under either of these alternative systems. The middle mass of the data for both systems is between 6 and 12 per cent, again very sharply lower than with plurality rule. Under List PR all but three of the elections we re-ran yielded scores of 12 per cent or less, while similarly under STV all but three elections gave DV scores of 13 per cent or less. The worst scores under List PR (of 25 in East Lindsey in 1991) and under STV (of 23 in Cumbria in 1997) are both ‘outliers’ in their data sets, that is very unusual observations very far removed from the middle mass of the data.
The best performing system in terms of DV scores, however, was clearly the Additional Member System (AMS), with a median DV score of just 3 per cent, and the middle mass of data lying between 2 and 4 per cent. Only a single result, West Somerset in 1995, yields a DV score above 5 per cent, and then this exceptional score only reaches 7 per cent. Thus under AMS the DV score is virtually perfect, around one seventh of its level under plurality rule and less than half the median DV scores under both List PR and STV. This performance by AMS is impressive because the system performs proportionally under all the diverse conditions in our cases, many of which (such as the dominant party systems in Hull and Newham) are inherently pretty hard for any electoral system to cope with. 




Average adjusted DV scores would fall to just under 18 per cent with STV, and the problem of high ADV scores would be cut back greatly compared with plurality rule. But there are still four cases with ADV scores over 35 per cent (spread across Croydon, Newham, Richmond and Hull), which represent very high levels for a system that is conventionally seen as a form of proportional representation. Nine out of the 18 cases where we successfully reran STV elections yielded ADV scores of more than a fifth (20 per cent). List PR does somewhat better in cutting back average ADV scores to just below 14 per cent, but the middle mass of the data is in much the same position as it is under STV. List PR also has a problem with two cases where its ADV scores are very high, reaching 54 in Hull in 1995 and 43 in East Lindsey in 1991. Over a quarter of elections rerun under List PR yielded ADV scores of a fifth (20 per cent) or more.
By contrast the Additional Member System (using a 50:50 classic AMS mix of local to top-up seats) produced ADV scores which with one exception were all under 10 per cent. (The anomaly was a 15 per cent score for Hull in 1997, when Labour got 63 per cent of the total votes - a difficult case for any electoral system to handle). The average ADV score under AMS was just 5 per cent, and the middle mass of data ran from 4 to 8 per cent. Thus the AMS median score was less than an eighth of that under plurality rule, a fifth of that under AV or SV, a third of that under STV and almost a third of that under List PR. Again AMS is the clear winner in proportionality terms in the cases that we examined, although both List PR and STV would also produce very valuable shifts towards greater proportionality in local elections.

Producing opposition and scrutiny of policy-making
One of the most problematic aspects of disproportionality, and a key reason for moving to more proportional methods of voting, is to combat cases where one-party dominance of a council becomes so severe that it is difficult to organize an effective opposition group and to subject the majority group’s policies to effective criticism and scrutiny. We can compare the performance of the different systems here in relation to two standards:
- If 90 per cent of council seats are held by a single party, opposition is effectively neutered, since its members will dominate all discussions in committees and council meetings.




Figure 3 shows that under plurality rule over a third of the elections we studied (9 out of 24 cases) produced results where 70 per cent of the council came from a single party, and in a sixth of our cases the leading  party controlled 90 per cent of the council. (Of course, we cannot infer from our data set to local authorities in general, but only make comparisons within the data set between different electoral systems’ effects). Under AV or SV this problem got worse, with a quarter of councils passing the 90 per cent criteria. Under List PR there were two cases of councils which passed the 70 per cent level (and a couple of other cases which came close to it), but no cases above the 90 per cent level. And under both STV and AMS none of the elections studied would have produced a council where one party held even 70 per cent of seats. Thus all three of the proportional systems would make a major contribution to producing situations where effective opposition was feasible everywhere across the country.
Figure 3: How the systems performed in limiting one-party dominance
Number of councils where one party held:









Producing majorities or coalitions




 Figure 4: How the systems performed in producing majorities or coalitions
Number of councils with:

System	Genuine majority control	‘Artificial’ majority control	Near-majority control	No   majority  
Plurality rule	 4	16	0	4
AV or SV	 4	14	2	4
List PR	 4	  9	2	9
STV	 4	  5	0	9
AMS	 4	  2	3	13  

little - a couple of cases of artificial majority control shift into near-majority control (where the largest party is just one or two votes off an overall majority, and hence very likely to retain single party control of committee chairs and other positions).
Amongst the proportional systems, some are more likely than others to create artificial majorities - albeit in situations where one party has close to majority support. List PR created artificial majorities in a third of the situations we analysed, and STV created them in a quarter of the cases. By contrast, AMS created artificial majorities on only two occasions out of 22. It also clearly produced the most ‘hung council’ situations, in three fifths of the cases, compared with half the cases for STV and less than two fifths for List PR. Thus a classic AMS solution, because it is far more proportional than any other system, will generate the most accurate representation of electorates where there is no majority.





It may seem a simple thing to ask of any electoral system that it should give most votes to the party with most votes, the second most seats to the party with the second most votes, and so on. But it is in fact a separate criterion from proportionality, and the operations of the warding system mean that is quite a demanding one at that. On two occasions in the post-war period, 1951 and February 1974, plurality rule elections for the House of Commons delivered the most seats to a party that ran second in terms of votes. Clearly this kind of mis-representing of parties’ popularity has the most serious consequences for partisan control of executive power, allowing the Conservatives to form a government on the first occasion and Labour and on the second.




Using AV or SV would accurately rank the parties in two of these cases. But in the 1998 Croydon election AV or SV would allocate Labour a larger lead than plurality rule, despite lagging 7 per cent behind the Tories in terms of votes. And under AV or SV new anomalies would arise - in Richmond in 1998, for instance, both the Tories and Labour would win 2 council seats each, despite Conservative support being 36 per cent and Labour support 21 per cent. These difficulties are probably caused by the fact that these systems take account of second preferences as well as first preferences. STV, which also counts multiple preferences, allocated Labour more seats than the Conservatives in the both the Croydon elections. In Birmingham in 1996 the Liberal Democrats on 19 per cent support would get 28 seats to the Tories 27 under STV, although the Conservatives’ have 29 per cent of the vote. Among more minor anomalies under STV parties separated by 9 per cent of the vote can end up tying in seats terms, as in Ashford in 1995 and Derby in 1997. And in both Newham elections the third-placed Liberal Democrats would get more seats than the second-placed Tories under STV. And in 1994 third-placed Labour on 18 per cent support would get 19 seats to the 15 seats going to the second-placed Tories, on 35 per cent support. Thus in 8 out of 18 cases STV apparently mis-ranks parties. But this effect needs to be strongly qualified by pointing out that these apparent divergences are only in terms of people’s first preference votes, whereas the whole point of STV is to ensure that one amongst each voter’s preferences will count somewhere in allocating seats, and that might be their second or lower preferences.
By contrast, with both plurality rule and with the alternative systems counting multiple preferences, both AMS and List PR would correctly rank the parties in the same terms as their first preference vote shares, across all elections bar one. The exception is Croydon in 1994, where both systems would leave Labour with a 2 seat winning margin over the Conservatives, but now in a hung council situation instead of majority control. 


Ease of implementation within existing ward structures
The warding arrangements of local government are very complex and hard to change. So an important aspect of proposals for reform is simply whether a change of the electoral system could be accomplished fairly easily from the existing pattern of wards. A complicating question is whether local authorities will in future operate on universal annual elections, as DETR plans at the time of writing (March 1999) imply. Under these arrangements all wards would have an election each year, with a third of councillors elected for three years, and a fourth (fallow) year for county elections to be held in areas with two tiers of local government. This approach requires that even under plurality rule there must be three-member wards across local authorities, an approach which the Local Government Commission (the body charged with boundary drawing of wards) has already begun to apply in London boroughs.




Figure 5: Electoral arrangements for plurality rule and for alternative electoral  systems	
Yearly pattern	Plurality rule	AV or SV	AMS 	List PR and STV
Four yearly elections	1,2 or 3 member wards	1 member wards 	1 member local wards (covering areas with 2 current councillors), plus 3 to 6 top-up areas per authority	5 or 6 member wards
Annual elections in thirds: rotating across wards	1,2 or 3 member wards	1 member wards 	1 member local wards (covering areas with 2 current councillors), plus top-up seats at large (whole locality area) or in 2 to 3 top-up areas	Rotating 5 or 6 member wards






The simplest situation for implementation applies to AV and SV. If annual elections across all wards are introduced then Figure 5 shows that AV and SV would require three-member wards, just as plurality rule does. The change here would be a minimal one. If elections once every four years were retained, however, or rotating annual elections are still allowed in different parts of a local authority area, then the existing multi-member wards in local authorities would have to be split into single-member areas - because neither SV nor AV can operate effectively with multiple seats to fill. The task involved would not be a large-scale one, but a shift to single-member wards would imply an on-going extra task for the Local Government Commission since ward boundaries would become more articulated than at present.
Figure 5 shows that with four yearly elections, changing to a ‘classic’ AMS solution 




Both STV and List PR would require existing wards to be assembled into broader multi-member wards each electing 5 or 6 councillors. In areas with three member wards, or a mixture of two and three-member wards, pairing existing areas would be sufficient. In those mainly rural districts where there are mixtures of single-member wards and larger areas, the new wards would be considerably bigger in territorial extent than current areas. The greatest change is likely to be in county councils which use universal single member wards. But in either case compositing wards to make the new areas would be an easy process. With four yearly elections all the new wards would have elections at the same time, while with rotating annual elections, the same 5 or 6 member wards would be used but only a third of them would have a poll in each year. The new larger areas would be simple to create and easier for the Local Government Commission to update over time.
Full annual elections in all wards for three years out of four would pose very great problems for either STV or List PR (as Figure 5 shows). The only way that these systems could be made to operate in this manner would be by creating a few very large wards with at least 15 councillors in each, where five councillors would be elected in each on-year. Thus a small council with 40 members might have just two wards in it, while a large council with 90 members would have only six wards. Essentially then combining STV or List PR with full annual elections across a local authority area would mean abolishing ward structures as they have conventionally been understood. It would be a very easy task to create such large areas and to then keep them under review, however.





The discussion of implementation arrangements above makes clear that using List PR or STV with full annual elections would basically destroy the notion of local links between councillors and their constituents. These systems would have to be used with four year term elections or with rotating annual elections if ward links to citizens were to remain. Wards would be larger than now, but over most of the country no more than twice as large. And advocates of List PR and STV argue that citizens would be better served by having a variety of local councillors representing different parties to whom they could take their grievances or problems. Councillors would have incentives to help effectively with such issues, or risk seeing votes tip over towards rival parties whose councillors are more responsive. Exponents of STV argue that because citizens can mark multiple preferences and vote across party lines this system would create especially strong incentives for councillors to deliver an effective service to constituents.
Under classic AMS with four-yearly elections or rotating annual elections the need to create top-up seats will double ward sizes in single-member areas, but leave them unchanged in two-member wards and even reduce the size of local wards in places which currently have three-member seats. However, with full annual elections the local seats under AMS would unambiguously be at least twice as large as any current wards, and in single-member areas they would be six times as large. 




Under AV or SV the ward links between councillors and citizens would either remain exactly the same as they are now under plurality rule if a local authority uses single-member wards, or if full annual elections are operated. Advocates of the system stress that councillors who have and hope to retain majority support will be additionally vigilant in looking after their constituents’ interests. They also point out that ward areas would become smaller under AV or SV if full annual elections are not being used and in areas where two- or three-member wards currently exist they must be split up into single-member areas.

Treating independents fairly
In considering any new electoral system it is important to consider not just its impact on the established main parties (Labour, the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in England, plus the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru in Wales), but also how it will affect the chances of those people who may wish to stand as elected representatives outside these organizations, by running either as an independent. The presence of such candidates may be an important guarantor of local democratic control, a safeguard against the established parties forming any form of local elite ‘cartel’ acting against most citizens’ interests or operating to exclude some policy issues from electoral consideration.




Figure 6: Independent councillors in our three rural districts
Independent councillors

District (number of 1 member wards)	Number (% of council)	Number elected unopposed (% of all independents unopposed)	Others unopposed 
East Lindsay 1991(38)	46  (77%)	25  (54%)	Tory         4Lib Dem   1
East Lindsay 1995(38)	41  (68%)	17  (41%)	Labour     3Tory         1
West Somerset 1991(10)	28  (72%)	 9  (39%)	Tory         3
West Somerset 1995(10)	13  (41%)	 5  (38%)	Tory         3Labour     1
South Hams 1991(26)	16  (36%)	 3  (19%)	Tory         8
South Hams 1995 (26)	15  (34%)	 3  (20%)	Tory         6






The level of uncontested elections in areas with high proportions of independents restricted our ability to test how alternative electoral systems would operate in those areas, and the limitations of our survey data meant that we could not test out how STV would work out in any of the rural districts. None the less we can make some general propositions about how the alterative systems would impact on independents.
The AV or SV systems would have the least impact, because they leave the current ward structure unchanged. Independent councillors might do reasonably well in winning second preferences from other parties’ voters (just as the Liberal Democrats do), so there is no reason to suppose that a shift to either majoritarian system would reduce their numbers. In our six case study elections, the results in four cases were the same under AV or SV as under plurality rule, and very similar in another case. Only in East Lindsay in 1995 did AV or SV produce a reduction in independent councillors, with Labour doing better at the second preference stage here. 




For List PR the evidence from all three districts and both elections shown in the Main Data Tables (on page 64) is that independents would be somewhat over-represented in terms of seats. However, this outcome is again highly dependent upon the ability and willingness of independent councillors across each local authority to group themselves into a singe list (including deciding on a ranking among themselves). If they cannot carry through this tricky operation, but instead each go forward as isolated independent candidates, then the detailed operation of the list PR seat allocation mechanism would discriminate against them. In particular, the d’Hondt method which works in favour of a single list of independents (who are a large ‘party’ in all three of our rural districts) would work against them if their candidatures were uncoordinated. An additional prospect is that votes for an uncoordinated independent list would tend to fall compared with the current situation, since in the new 5 or 6 member wards it would be almost impossible for independent candidates to develop a positive reputation outside their immediate locality. Nor would they have the campaign resources to raise their ‘name recognition’ in such large areas.
These considerations suggest that the prospects of individual independents would be particularly poor under the Single Transferable Vote. Of course, we have not been able to test an STV election in the three rural districts, but the ward areas would be the same size as for List PR while the STV ballot paper design would tend to make it easier for uncoordinated single candidacies to happen, whereas List PR is off-putting and creates strong incentives for independents to co-operate with each other. Against this effect, the stability of independent representation under AV or SV suggests that these councillors may attract second preferences from other voters and benefit in this way under STV. Nonetheless we would hazard a guess (and it can be no more than that) that STV would be the alternative system most inimical to the representation of independents. It should also be noted that if either List PR or STV were applied in tandem with full annual elections in very large 15 member wards, the effect would be to severely depress independents’ chances of securing representation.






It is also important when considering new electoral systems to assess how their introduction will impact on ‘minor’ parties, those which normally do not secure councillors under plurality rule elections. There are two considerations here, and they pull in different directions. On the one hand small parties provide a source of dynamism in the political system, again guarding against any threat of collusion by the established local parties and providing an important vehicle by which new issues and priorities are raised to prominence. In 1989, for example, the Greens achieved a 15 per cent national vote share in the European elections, which lead all the established parties to assign a higher priority to environmental policies.
On the other hand not all minor or fringe parties are welcome contributors to the diversity of local political life. In big city areas especially there have been some concerns even under plurality rule that extreme racist parties could win council seats, as the British National party did in a council for a brief period in Tower Hamlets following a low turnout in a by-election. An alternative electoral system which makes it more likely that parties with smaller vote shares can win seats could have adverse consequences if it makes extremist parties seem more mainstream because they secure representation in the council. A further adverse consequence of such a system could be that it encourages factions within established parties to split off and stand in their own right, and thus contributes to the fragmentation of the existing party system.




Under AMS the increased size of local wards will typically make it somewhat harder for smaller parties to win local seats (especially those with marked single ward ‘bastions’ of support).  However, again the top-up seats provide an alternative route to representation, and minor parties confront none of the organizational problems in assembling a single list that might hamper independents’ representation at the top-up stage. The basic threshold level of support that a minor party will need to win in order to be represented is given by dividing 100 per cent by the total number of local and top-up seats in each top-up area.  Thus with 5 local seats and 5 top-up seats any party with 10 per cent support can be certain of winning a seat, and with a favourable fragmentation of other parties’ votes it may be possible to elect a councillor with as little as 9 or even 8 per cent of the vote across the top-up area as a whole (which here would be equal to 10 existing wards). Threshold levels of this order operate in the Scottish and Welsh AMS systems. Thus AMS is much more favourable for well-supported minor parties than plurality rule. In addition, if voters engage in ‘ticket splitting’ by casting different votes at the top-up stage from those used to elect their local ward councillors the effects may benefit minor parties. This effect is especially likely to develop over time where a major party wins so many local seats that it has little or no chance of winning seats at the top-up stage.  For instance, Labour voters in Newham or Hull might well work out that their party is not going to win top-up seats in addition to clean-sweeping through the local wards, and thus might give their top-up votes to another party - perhaps an established party like the Liberal Democrats or perhaps to the Greens. Note that although the threshold under AMS would be lower than plurality rule it would still be around twice the legal thresholds used in Germany and in the London Assembly legislation (5 per cent). And in Britain no racist or fascist party has ever amassed 10 per cent support over the wide areas used for topping-up under AMS.
For List PR and STV the basic electoral threshold will also be set at or just below 100 per cent divided by the number of seats in the multi-member wards. So with 5 member seats a party would need 20 per cent support, and with 6 member seats 16 per cent support, in order to be guaranteed winning a councillor. In practice with a favourable fragmentation of the other parties’ vote shares minor parties might win representation with 2 or 3 per cent less than these basic levels. Thus these systems would not on the face of it broaden the diversity of local political representation in Britain. Instead with 5 member wards their thresholds for parties to win seats would be much the same under List PR and STV as plurality rule’s ‘effective’ threshold is now. However, STV exponents argue that by counting multiple preferences their system may be more favourable to minor parties, who could attract late preferences from major party supporters that may help them win a seat in the last round of the seat allocation process.




Figure 7: The effects of alternative systems on representation of minor parties in our case studies
Number of localities where minor parties get:







down from the current allocation, but the system moved equal number of localities in different directions. The same was broadly true of List PR. However, under AMS the number of localities where minor parties won seats was higher than under than under plurality rule. Note that all the figures in Figure 7 should be treated with particular caution because we normally had to assume in compiling them that the ‘other’ vote was a homogenous entity - whereas in some cases it was not. However, it is also worth noting here that a new electoral system which no longer treats minor parties as unfairly as plurality rule may tend to encourage more candidates to run for small parties like the Greens or the council tax payers’ or residents’ parties found in some Labour inner city areas.








PART 5: IMPLEMENTING ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS 

In public policy terms there are many cases where policy-makers can identify a state of affairs which would be preferable to the status quo, but where the transition pathway to get us there is so off-putting that no action is quickly taken. We have already argued that the central job of reconciling existing ward structures in local government with the requirements of the existing system can be achieved for all of the systems we have reviewed. Here we look at two further aspects of ‘implementability’ questions: some consistency in design issues; and creating a changeover process for local voting systems.

Consistency in design issues




It might be objected that voters will need to develop a fine grain sense of how the political chances of their votes being effective vary across different systems, which is certainly a highly relevant thing for voters to know about under plurality rule or under AV or SV. However, under any of the three broadly proportional systems (AMS, List PR or STV) our case studies strongly suggest that the outcomes will not vary so drastically that voters need to understand the details of these systems’ seat allocation processes in order to vote intelligently and effectively. If they assume that parties’ chances of representation will be conditioned essentially by their respective vote shares then voters will not go far wrong under any of the systems in deciding how to express their preferences. In an ideal world we might want all the local authorities in a county area with two-tier local governance to agree on using a common electoral system. But in terms of practical politics a simpler level of basic congruity between electoral systems at the two tiers would probably be sufficient.
Some variation in electoral arrangements across England will also be needed to cope with different geographical, social and political situations.  Adapting systems for rural areas could be important, over and above the issues of treating independents fairly reviewed above. Rural wards have sparse populations and are territorially large. The bigger they become the more difficult it is for any councillor to effectively represent their constituents in terms of having an intimate local knowledge of the area, traveling time and so on. It is important to look for legitimate ways of coping with these differences. Some early schemas for electoral reform at national level using STV attempted to cope with this difficulty by having smaller constituency areas in rural parts of the country. A notorious 1970s Liberal map of ‘fair voting’ proposals for Parliamentary elections even proposed single-member constituencies (using AV) for rural areas while seats as large as 9 or 10 members would be used in urban areas (using STV). Such a schema would amount to a gerrymander, forcing proportionality in urban areas but not outside. If the needs of rural areas are seen as requiring special treatment more legitimate steps might be to not use annual elections in such areas, because of their adverse impacts in increasing ward sizes, or possibly to increase the size of rural councils at the same time as new voting systems come in.




Annual elections also appear to be partly incompatible with the idea of promoting executive mayors. We noted in Part 3 that it will be important for elected mayors to be able to demonstrate a convincing level of electoral legitimacy. And under the proportional systems if their party does not win overall control of the council mayors must be able to construct an effective coalition majority, in order to be able to get their budgets and policy proposals adopted. (This necessity is somewhat less in the ‘strong mayor’ structure created for Greater London. Here the mayor will be able to pass her or his  budget through more or less intact unless 60 per cent or more of the 25 London Assembly members vote for their own version of a budget instead). But inherently mayoral elections can only happen once every four years. If council elections are held in the same area annually, then at some stage in the four year term parties opposing the mayor may increase their council seats, and perhaps may win a majority of votes and council seats. This possibility can be minimized by locating the Mayoral election at the beginning of year 1, with annual elections to the council at the beginnings of years 2 and 3, and the beginning of year 4 as the ‘off’ year for council voting. Here if the Mayor can survive with her or his popularity intact for only two years, their last two years in office are protected. Nonetheless changes in the year 2 or year 3 elections could still spell an end to the mayor’s majority coalition, either because its component parties lose enough seats to become a minority, or because the interim election outcomes stimulate one of the coalition partners to leave. If opposition parties can also claim a more recent electoral mandate than the mayor, she or he could easily become a ‘lame duck’ for the remainder of their term. So the twin aims of government policy - annual elections promoted by the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions, and executive Mayors promoted by 10 Downing Street, do not seem fully compatible.


Creating a changeover process for local voting systems




 A first stage would be for ministers to initiate a sustained debate about the issues involved in changing voting methods in the local government world and in the mass media. Most newspapers have already indicated dissatisfaction with the current state of local democracy. A small investigative Commission would be asked to survey the debate and to crystalize out its themes in a set of specific proposals for achieving a better local voting system. To cope with the variations in local authorities’ sizes, warding systems and political situations a small number of reform templates might be produced, giving  around 3 variants of the same basic system,  rather than aiming for a single national blueprint which may be hard to adapt to fit all areas’ needs and traditions.
 The second stage would then be for Parliament to pass legislation to enact the new system, hopefully one which enjoys a reasonable consensus of support. The law would probably also need to either beef up the Local Government Commission’s powers, expertise and staffing for a time so that it could supervise reorganization. Alternatively it could set up a small Reorganization Commission (RC) to visit local authorities, hold brief hearings and propose which variant of the new voting system should be adopted in each area. The RC would not itself draw up seat boundaries, but pass that role to the Local Government Commission once the decisions have been made on the size of council and the precise variant of the new system to be used in each area. The RC might also be a neutral body to referee decisions on introducing an Executive Mayor in the light of local public opinion. Choosing the RC option would also allow the visiting commission to consider issues about the appropriate size of the council and recommend changes to the numbers of wards and councillors, if provision for tackling such related issues is included in the legislation. The recommendations of the Local Government Commission or the RC would have to be approved by the Secretary of State at DETR.




 The overall result would be a process of organic change, that could implement a new and more proportional voting system for local government within around three to five years from passage of the legislation (depending on how many extra resources were assigned to the LGC). In the longer term it would be important also that the legislation provides clear guidelines and decisions for LGC to progress rewarding over a longer period. The reorganization of electoral methods could also possibly be used to implement reductions in the sizes of councils if that was felt to be needed, and to achieve more impetus for Executive Mayors as well. In a phased implementation process immediate action could be targeted on those councils with a poor record of local democracy (for instance, conspicuously low elections and no use of referenda) or whose mode of operating has had the most deleterious impact on the public image of local government. Deciding such matters would be inherently controversial, but DETR could set up an independent panel (with an appeals process) to make recommendations to ministers.


	CONCLUSIONS: THE VIABILITY OF REFORM





The main practical momentum behind AMS (or SV Plus which is similar to AMS in its operations) is that this system is already being applied in three important areas of the country for devolved assemblies. It has already proved acceptable to both Labour and the Liberal Democrats, as well as to the nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales. And although the Conservatives occasionally still denounce the system in a formal, rhetorical level, they have not pledged to scrap the system in favour of reintroducing plurality rule in Scotland, or Wales or London, should there once again be a Conservative Commons majority. The Jenkins Commission recommended a variant of AMS, the AV Plus system for use in an eventual voting systems referendum, and hence possible implementation at Westminster. There is some chance that in putting a proposal to voters the government might act to simplify the Jenkins scheme by moving it towards a straight AMS pattern, or by using SV instead of AV for conducting the local constituency elections. Voters cannot be expected to cope with a bewildering variety of different electoral systems, so the push would in that case be to standardize on AMS. And the consistency argument would lead on to using SV as the preferred majoritarian system for electing any further executive mayors.




Even so there might be incentives to try and keep the numbers of top-up members to an absolute minimum by having a large majority of each council elected in local constituencies, and only a small minority elected at the top-up stage. In recent research for the Jenkins Commission we have shown that both AMS and mixed systems (SV Plus and AV Plus) would perform much better in Westminster elections than was previously thought feasible (Dunleavy and Margetts with Weir, 1998). Thus we show that a 75:25 mix of constituency to top-up MPs could be broadly proportional, and a 67:33 mix would be fully proportional. But it should not be forgotten that the Westminster Parliament has 659 MPs, making it a giant assembly in comparison with all local councils. In these smaller assemblies it is likely that more evenly balanced numbers of constituency and top-up councillors would be needed to achieve proportionality.  We have not had the research time or resources to make systematic comparisons of how AMS would work out in our case study authorities with different mixes of local and top-up members. We would expect that 50:50, 57:43 and 67:33 mixes would all produce closely similar results, as they do in other contexts, and that going beyond that to say a 75:25 mix would produce sharply worsened disproportionality. We would not recommend going beyond a 67:33 mix in most areas of the country, because beyond this level the AMS method no longer guarantees proportional outcomes, its key attraction in our review above. But in very exceptional circumstances, such as sparsely populated rural areas without a locally dominant party, it might be possible to go to an AMS system using a 75:25 ratio without adding too much to DV scores. Such issues would need to be the focus for further detailed research. 








APPENDIX: THE SCOPE AND METHODS OF THIS STUDY

It is a fairly simple matter to model how alternative voting systems which count only people’s first preferences will operate, since existing local election results under plurality rule also count first preferences only. Thus to understand the List PR system we need only to group together voting data from local wards into new multi-member wards of the right size (5 or 6 members), and then to apply a particular List PR rule for allocating seats. We use the d’Hondt rule, which is a divisor method, mainly because this system has already been adopted in Britain for the 1999 European elections, and for allocating top-up seats under the AMS systems in Scotland, Wales and London. It is simple for returning officers to operate, and because it (slightly) favours large parties it is likely to be chosen again if List PR is used in local elections.




Modeling alternative systems which count multiple preferences (that is, SV and AV, and STV) is more difficult, since we had to estimate how voters in each locality would cast their second and subsequent preferences. Since current local elections count only first preferences, the only possible source of data on patterns of second and subsequent preferences must be surveys.  The only available data on British citizens’ second, third and fourth preferences comes from major surveys which we conducted immediately after the 1992 and 1997 general elections. Because these surveys were very large, covering 9200 people in 1992 and 8,400 in 1997 the data is very rich, and for 1997 gives a good estimate of voters’ preference structures in 18 regions of the country.  In each local authority area we looked at two elections, one as close as we could get to 1992 and one as close as we could get to 1997. We also wanted to cover a couple of different political situations, in the early and then the later 1990s in order to show variations across elections even within authorities. (Hull was an exception since it became a unitary authority only in 1995, and we wanted to study two elections where the council controlled the same range of functions). 
To model alternative systems which count multiple preferences (that is, SV and AV, and STV), we had to start by looking at actual first preference votes shares in local wards, but then assume that voters in each locality will cast their second and subsequent preferences in line with the patterns of second and subsequent preferences in their region found in our surveys for 1992 and 1997. For example, we assume that Labour voters in Hull have the same second and subsequent preferences to Labour voters in north Yorkshire and Humberside as a whole, and so do Hull’s Tory and Liberal Democrat voters. Obviously there are three possible things that could go wrong here: 
- Patterns of second and subsequent preferences in general election choices may be different in a particular locality from those at the wider level of the region. Some localities will be more politically distinctive in their region than others. But remember that our data on first preferences from the actual local elections already controls for any distinctiveness due to party composition of the vote. Also our surveys used quite fine-grain regions and separated out conurbation areas from their hinterlands. 




- One or both of our local election dates may differ from 1992 or 1997, as the listing above demonstrates, chiefly because some authorities only hold elections on a fixed cycle which did not include those years. Thus the patterns of second and subsequent preferences in a region and locality may have changed between the local election date and the nearest general election we are using to estimate second and subsequent preferences. We do not believe that the possible differences here will be large. We have no means of ascertaining whether there were any movements in second or subsequent preferences except between 1992 and 1997. But the patterns of first preferences in intervening years did not vary widely. Instead there was a step change in British public opinion in the autumn of 1992, following the Black Wednesday currency crisis and Britain’s exit from the ERM, a change that should be captured well in all our comparisons. However, for those systems that count multiple preferences our estimations should none the less be treated with additional caution given the inescapable divergence of dates between the surveys and the local elections.
For SV and AV elections we used the existing pattern of wards unchanged. Where a candidate received majority support in the local elections they would obviously also win under SV or AV.  But we re-analysed wards where councillors were elected with less than majority (50 per cent) support, redistributing voters for smaller parties between the parties still in competition in line with patterns of second and subsequent preferences for voters of these parties at regional level. In two- or three-member wards we used the vote shares based on the most successful candidates for each party (usually listed first) and the re-analysis procedure above to allocate all AV or SV seats. Note that multi-member wards cannot be used with AV, unlike plurality rule. So we have in effect had to assume that two- or three-member wards are divided into single-member wards, each of which mirrors the overall ward profile in terms of party votes shares.








To avoid these problems it might seem straightforward to proceed by using the votes share compiled on a first candidate basis. On the other hand, it could be argued that where the total votes basis is only slightly different from the figures calculated on a first candidate basis the total votes share percentages capture an important fact - that better organized parties will field more complete candidate slates even under a proportional representation system. In addition to losing this information about party behaviours, figures compiled on a first candidate basis may also tend to overstate the support for second or third-placed parties where voters have to mark a number of preferences (SV, AV and STV). We resolve this analytic dilemma in the following compromise way:
- We compile votes shares on a total votes and a first candidates basis for each locality as a whole, for each top-up area under AMS, and for each multi-member ward under List PR and STV. The Main Data Tables provide both votes shares in all localities where a divergence is possible, and the total votes basis where it is not. 
- We compare at a locality level the difference between these votes shares, and if the difference is small (less than the exclusion threshold in the locality as a whole for a seat to change hands) we proceed using the total votes shares.
- If the divergence between the two votes shares is larger, however, we use the votes shares compiled on a first candidates basis. We make clear in the Main Data Tables which votes share is being used for compiling the deviation from proportionality statistic, and hence also in all seats allocations under AMS, List PR or STV.
There are other interpolation methods for compensating for incomplete candidatures used by some analysts to compile vote share statistics. We have strictly avoided such approaches since they create additional problems of their own when analysing different electoral systems, and their estimates are not based on voters’ own observable behaviour, as ours are.




Some readers may ask why this research covers just 12 authorities, and 24 different local elections in all. Why was it not possible to model the impacts of alternative electoral systems for all English local authorities instead? In fact this task would be virtually impossible, for there are simply too many variations in local authorities’ ward systems, the timing of elections, the number of parties, the presence of independents and so on for a comprehensive analysis to be viable. Even with the current electoral system, these difficulties of comparison mean that relatively little is still known about national patterns of voting across all local authorities, despite the sterling work done in the last decade in beginning to compile some basic statistics (Rallings and Thrasher, 1997). Just updating the existing statistics on the operations of first past the post elections in local government is a full-time job for one research institute. In addition, the analysis undertaken here involves highly intensive work, in which a great many decisions and calculations must be made that are feasible only on the basis of detailed knowledge of each local area. There is no way of short-cutting this time-consuming process to arrive at a national picture. In total we re-ran 93 elections in order to be able to compile data for our 12 authorities, and it would take several years of research and a great deal of funding to compile the same information on a nationwide basis. Nor would such an effort be necessary or fruitful, because the results we give below are so clear in their implications that in our view repeating the analysis on a wider scale would be highly unlikely to lead to substantively different conclusions.
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Across the two elections analysed here Ashford moved from being a Conservative-dominated council in 1991, to being a hung council in 1995. In 1991 introducing AV or SV would still have left the Conservatives with an artificial majority (but a much smaller one), while all the other proportional systems would have created a hung council. STV would have greatly reduced the Conservative lead over the Liberal Democrats in terms of seats in this year, leaving the Tories only two seats ahead despite having 16 per cent more votes. This result seems anomalous but reflects warding influences and second preference votes. In 1995 even FPTP worked well in DV terms in Ashford, and so choosing an alternative system would have made little difference in that year.

ASHFORD1991	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	43.8	21.3	27.5	7.5	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate for each party)%	44.0	21.1	27.5	7.4	100		
FPTP Seats (total)	29	  7	11	2	49	 15	   27
FPTP Seats (contested)	27	  7	11	1	46	 15	   26
SV or AV Seats	27	  7	13	2	49	 11	   20
SV Seats (contested)	25	  7	13	1	46	 11	   20
List PR Seats	24	  9	12	4	49	   6	   11
STV Seats	18	12	16	3	49	   8	   15











Votes (based on total votes)%	32.5	26.4	34.2	6.9	100		
Votes % (based on 1st candidate for each party)	32.2	26.3	33.8	7.7	100		
FPTP Seats (total)	18	13	15	3	49	  5	    7
FPTP Seats (contested)	15	13	15	3	46	  2	    4
SV or AV Seats	16	14	16	3	49	  3	    4
SV Seats (contested)	13	14	16	3	46	  5	    8
List PR Seats	15	14	16	4	49	  3	    5
STV Seats	15	15	15	4	49	  6	    8
AMS (47: 53) Seats	16	14	16	3	49	  2	    4








In 1992 the Conservatives were well ahead of Labour in Birmingham, and FPTP operated reasonably well, giving them a narrow majority of seats. SV or AV would have transferred seats from the Tories to the Liberal Democrats (six seats on a full council basis), enough to create a hung council. The same effect would have been achieved under STV or AMS, but under List PR the Conservatives would have narrowly retained a majority.
In 1996 Labour surged into the lead in votes and under FPTP profited from a big ‘leader’s bias’ effect, creating a high DV score. SV or AV would have done nothing to redress this imbalance. List PR would have left a clear Labour majority despite their minority vote (47 per cent), but both STV and AMS would have created a hung council in 1996 conditions. Only AMS would have produced a low DV score.


BIRMINGHAM  1992	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes %	47.7	35.6	14.9	1.9	100		
FPTP Seats	21	15	 3	0	  39	    9	   17
SV or AV Seats	19	15	 5	0	  39	    4	     8
List PR Seats	59	47	11	0	117	    7	   14
STV Seats	45	43	29	0	117	   11	   21
AMS (50:50) Seats	56	42	19	0	117	     2	     4








BIRMINGHAM 1996	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes %	29.3	47.3	18.7	4.7	100		
FPTP Seats	  6	28	  5	0	  39	   25	   47
SV or AV Seats	  5	28	  6	0	  39	   25	   47
List PR Seats	32	65	15	5	117	    8	   16
STV Seats	27	54	28	8	117	    7	   14









Buckinghamshire has been Conservative-controlled since its inception, and at the end of the 1990s it remained the only Tory county council in Britain. In 1993 the Conservatives gained a minority vote (43 per cent), only 8 per cent ahead of the Liberal Democrats, but won nearly two thirds of the seats. SV or AV would have greatly curtailed this majority, but still left the Conservatives in control. All of the proportional systems would have created a hung council, although only narrowly in the case of List PR.
In 1997 the Conservative vote increased slightly, as did their majority. AV or SV would have made little change in this year. List PR would have brought the Tories down to parity with the other parties, while STV and AMS would both have created a hung council.

BUCKING-HAMSHIRE 1993	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes %	43.2	16.5	35.6	4.8	100		
FPTP Seats	35	  4	12	3	  54	  23	   40
SV or AV Seats	28	  4	20	2	  54	  10	   18
List PR Seats	26	  7	20	1	  54	    6	   11
STV Seats	21	12	19	2	  54	    6	   10
AMS (50: 50) Seats	23	  9	19	3	  54	    1	     2






BUCKING-HAMSHIRE 1997	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes %	45.4	20.9	30	3.7	100		
FPTP Seats	37	  5	11	1	  54	  23	  42
SV or AV Seats	31	  5	17	1	  54	  14	  25
List PR Seats	27	10	16	1	  54	    5	    8
STV Seats	24	12	17	1	  54	    3	    5










In both the elections analysed here the Conservatives won more votes in Croydon than did Labour (2 per cent more in 1994 and 8 per cent more in 1998). And yet under FPTP Labour won majorities of the council seats, because its vote was more ‘efficiently’ distributed across wards. In 1994 AV or SV would have corrected this effect without improving proportionality much. But STV would have intensified the pro-Labour bias, cutting the Tory seats down to eight fewer than under FPTP and leaving Labour with majority control. List PR and AMS would both have come closest to delivering a proportional outcome, creating a hung council in each case. Both systems would still have left Labour with a couple more seats than the Tories though.
In 1998 conditions AV or SV would have been less proportional than FPTP and increased Labour’s over-representation. STV would have had similar effects, again making the ‘wrong’ party the majority winner. Both List PR and AMS would have correctly made the Conservatives the largest party. But List PR would have given the Tories majority control, while AMS would have allocated more seats to the Liberal Democrats and created a hung council.

CROYDON 1994	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes % (based on total)	43.2	41.1	14.4	1.3	100		
Votes % (based on 1st candidate for each party)	42.7	39.6	14.7	2.9	100		
FPTP Seats	30	40	  0	0	  70	  18	  31
SV or AV Seats	35	32	  3	0	  70	  13	  23
List PR Seats	31	33	  6	0	  70	    7	  13
STV Seats	22	36	12	0	  70	  13	  23




Notes: There are 27 wards in Croydon, eleven 2-member and sixteen 3-member, making 70 seats in all. There are two ways of calculating the vote, explained in the main text. Note, that for calculating the vote for other parties on a first candidate basis, we have taken the largest vote for candidates in each ‘other’ party and added them together. For AMS there are 3 top-up areas. For List PR and STV there are eight 5-member and four 6-member constituencies. 

CROYDON 1998	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes % (based on total votes)	47.9	39.6	11.5	0.9	100		
Votes % (based on votes for 1st candidate)	46.9	38.6	12.2	2.3	100		
FPTP Seats	31	38	  1	0	  70	  16	   30
SV or AV Seats	27	40	  3	0	  70	  19	   35
List PR Seats	36	31	  3	0	  70	    8	   16
STV Seats	26	36	  8	0	  70	  12	   23











FPTP Seats (total)	27	39	13	4	  83	   9	  15
FPTP Seats (contested)	25	37	13	2	  77	   8	  13
SV or AV Seats	25	38	16	4	  83	   9	  15
SV seats (contested)	23	36	16	2	  77	   9	  16
List PR Seats	33	35	15	0	  83	   3	    5
STV Seats	36	34	13	0	  83	   5	    9
AMS (48: 52) Seats	33	35	14	1	  83	   3	   5








FPTP Seats (total)	24	44	11	4	  83	  14	   24
FPTP Seats (contested)	23	39	11	4	  77	  12	   21
SV or AV Seats	22	45	12	4	  83	  16	  26
SV Seats (contested)	21	40	12	4	  77	  14	  23
List PR Seats	31	37	13	2	  83	    4	    7
STV Seats	15	53	14	1	  83	  23	  39
AMS (48:52) Seats	29	36	17	1	  83	    4	    7













FPTP Seats	15	43	  6	1	  65	  17	  33
SV or AV Seats	16	42	  6	1	  65	  15	  30
List PR Seats	18	36	10	1	  65	    6	  12
STV Seats	19	33	13	0	  65	    5	    9
AMS (50:50) Seats	19	33	11	2	  65	    2	    4








FPTP Seats	13	44	  6	1	  64	  21	   40
SV or AV Seats	12	45	  6	1	  64	  22	   43
List PR Seats	18	35	10	1	  64	    6	   12
STV Seats	16	32	16	9	  64	    6	   13
AMS (50:50) Seats	17	32	13	2	  64	    3	     5









In terms of total vote shares nearly half of votes cast in 1991 went to independent candidates, and a clear majority did so in 1995. However, in terms of the votes for first candidates the Independent share was less (around 43 per cent). In both years the Independents won two thirds of council seats, partly through uncontested elections. AV or SV would have strongly reduced the Independent’s representation in both years in our simulations. But we give little credence to these results because the survey research on which they were based was conducted in relation to general election voting and at the regional level. Thus it could not take account the distinctive features of local politics in East Lindsey - and hence must have severely under-played the number of second preferences Independents would get in this distinctive context. Under List PR there would have been handsome Independent majorities in both years, assuming that the Independents would have been able to successfully organize a list. We tried but could not implement either an AMS or an STV election in East Lindsey in either year.

EASTLINDSAY1991	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Ind	Green	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes  (based on total) %	10.9	16.2	15.9	49.8	  7.2	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	14.1	15.5	18.7	42.4	  9.3	100		
FPTP Seats (total)	  5	  5	  4	46	  0	  60	  34	   60
FPTP Seats (contested)	  1	  5	  3	21	  0	  30	  29	   50
SV or AV Seats	  7	  3	  9	41	  0	  60	  26	   45
SV or AV Seats (contested)	  3	  3	  8	16	  0	  30	  19	   33
List PR Seats (based on total votes)	  5	 3	  5	26	  3	 42	  13	   26









EAST LINDSAY1995	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Ind	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total) % 	3.5	28.1	10.7	54.3	3.4	100		
Votes % (based on votes for 1st candidate)	5.3	31.1	14.8	43.6	5.2	100		
FPTP Seats (total)	1	11	  3	41	4	  60	  26	  47
FPTP Seats (contested)	0	  8	  3	24	3	  38	  22	  40
SV or AV Seats	1	16	  6	34	3	  60	  13	  23
SV seats (contested)	0	13	  6	17	2	  38	    5	    9
List PR Seats (based on total votes) %	1	13	  5	30	5	  54	    7	  16
List PR (based on 1st candidate votes)	2	14	  5	28	5	  54	  12	  22








 Hull is safe Labour territory, with the party gaining over two thirds of the votes cast in 1995 and all the council seats under FPTP. It also won just under two thirds of the vote and 95 per cent of the seats under FPTP in 1997. In both years introducing AV or SV would make no difference to the outcome, so that again no viable opposition would be possible. List PR would have given Labour over four fifths of council seats in the first election, falling to just over two thirds in the second. Both STV and AMS would bring Labour’s representation down to something closer to its vote shares at the two elections, but STV would have given the Liberal Democrats more seats at the Tories’ expense in 1995. Labour would retain majority control under all the systems, but the seats for combined opposition parties would only approximate their substantial vote share under AMS or STV.

HULL1995	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	7.2	73.2	18.3	1.3	100		
Votes % (based on votes for 1st candidate)	11.3	67.4	19.7	1.6	100		
FPTP Seats	 0	60	  0	0	  60	  33	  100
SV or AV Seats	 3	57	  0	0	  60	  28	    85
List PR Seats (based on 1st candidate)	 1	51	 8	0	  60	  18	    54
STV Seats (based for 1st candidate)	 2	38	18	2	  60	  12	    37  
AMS (67:33) Seats (based on 1st candidate)	 6	42	12	0	  60	    3	     9







Votes  (based on total votes)%	15.7	62.9	20.2	1.2	100		
FPTP Seats	  0	19	  1	0	 20	  32	  87
SV or AV Seats	  0	19	  1	0	 20	  32	  87
List PR Seats	  6	43	11	0	  60	    9	  24
STV Seats	12	34	14	0	  60	    7	  20
AMS (67:33) Seats	  8	41	11	0	  60	    5	  15








Newham is a rock-solid Labour area, where the party gained clear majority support in both elections, under FPTP winning all but one of the seats in 1994 and all the seats in 1998. Yet the combined opposition vote was 44 per cent in the first election (split evenly and hence ineffectively between the Tories, Liberal Democrats and ‘other’ candidates), and 42 per cent in the second election. SV or AV would have given a few more ‘other’ seats in both elections, but otherwise would not have made a difference. All the proportional systems would have produced Labour secure majorities, but List PR would have been more favourable to the party than the others. STV would have given the Conservatives many fewer seats than any of the other proportional systems. Both List PR and STV would have had high DV scores, contrasting strongly with the much more proportional outcomes under AMS.

NEWHAM 1994	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	18.1	60	11.5	10.7	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	18.3	56	11.7	13.8	100		
FPTP Seats	  1	59	  0	  0	  60	 42	   96
SV or AV Seats	  0	55	  0	  5	  60	 36	   81
List PR Seats (based on total votes)	10	41	  4	  5	  60	   9	   22
List PR (based on 1st candidate)	10	41	  4	  5	  60	 12	   28
STV Seats (based on total votes)	10	34	10	  6	  60	   5	   13
STV (based on 1st candidate)	  1	37	12	10	  60	 17	   38
AMS (50:50)Seats	11	38	  6	  5	  60	   4	   10
AMS (based on 1st candidate)	10	36	  6	  8	  60	   4	     9







Votes (based on total votes) %	12.9	70.6	  4	12.6	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	17	57.6	  8.1	17.3	100		
FPTP Seats	  0	60	  0	  0	  60	  42	  100
SV or AV Seats	  0	57	  0	  3	  60	  37	    88
List PR Seats	  5	51	  0	  4	  60	  15	    49
List PR Seats (based on 1st candidate)	8	41	  2	  9	 60	  11	    25
STV Seats	  4	35	  8	13	  60	  19	    63
STV Seats (based on 1st candidate)	  4	36	10	10	  60	  11	    26
AMS (50:50)Seats	  8	44	 3	  5	  60	    4	    14








Richmond is an interesting anomaly - a local authority where the Liberal Democrats are the strongest local party and reap the ‘leaders’ bias’ effect under FPTP.  With near majority support they gained four fifths of seats in 1994. And with a somewhat reduced vote in 1998 they were still strongly over-represented. In both cases using AV or SV would have sharply worsened these disproportional results, giving the Liberal Democrats all but two seats in 1994 and all but four seats in 1998, and effectively eliminating any viable opposition. In both years the STV election process would have sharply cut back Liberal Democrat representation, giving them one fewer seat than Labour in 1994 and parity with the Conservatives in 1998, despite their appreciable leads in votes over both parties. By contrast List PR and AMS would each have made the Liberal Democrats the largest party, and got the rankings of the other parties’ seats correctly in line with their vote shares. All three proportional systems would have produced a hung council in both years.


RICHMOND 1994	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	35.3	17.9	46.8	0.1	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	35	18.4	46.3	0.3	100		
FPTP Seats	  7	  2	43	0	  52	  36	  68
SV or AV Seats	  2	  0	50	0	  52	  50	  93
List PR Seats	20	  7	25	0	  52	    5	    8
STV Seats	15	19	18	0	  52	  19	  35
AMS (50:50)Seats	18	  9	25	0	  52	    1	    3






RICHMOND 1998	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	36.2	20.5	43.1	0.3	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	35.6	20.9	42.7	0.8	100		
FPTP Seats	14	  4	34	0	  52	  23	   40
SV or AV Seats	  2	  2	48	0	  52	  50	   87
List PR Seats	20	  8	24	0	  52	    5	     9
STV Seats	19	14	19	0	  52	    7	   12
AMS (50:50)Seats	17	10	25	0	  52	    5	     9








The Conservatives were the largest party in South Hams in 1991, but fell back to parity with the Liberal Democrats in 1995 - with a strong ‘other’ vote in both years. Under FPTP the Tories moved from majority control in the first election, to being the largest party in a hung council after the second. Using SV or AV would have made some difference, mainly at the expense of the Conservatives and ‘others’, moving the council just into ‘hung’ status in 1991 and pushing the Tories below the ‘others’ in 1995. Both List PR and AMS would have created hung councils in both years. But List PR would have been more generous to the largest parties (the Tories and the ‘others’) and would have produced somewhat higher DV scores. It was not possible to model STV elections for this area.


SOUTH HAMS1991	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes %	44.8	14.7	15.1	25.4	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate)%	40	12.9	18.3	28.8	100		
FPTP Seats	23	  1	  4	16	  44	 20	  33
FPTP Seats (contested)	15	  1	  4	13	  33	 16	  27
SV or AV Seats	21	  2	  8	13	  44	   9  	  14
SV Seats (contested)	13	  2	  8	10	  33	   7	  12
List PR Seats (based on 1st candidate) %	19	  5	  6	14	  44	   6  	  10  
AMS (50:50) Seats (based on 1st candidate)	18	 5	  7	14	  44	  4	    7  







SOUTH HAMS1995	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Other	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total) %	30.4	15.1	30.4	24.2	100		
Votes  (based on 1st candidate) %	30.9	17.5	30	21.7	100		
FPTP Seats	17	  2	10	15	  44	  20	  29
FPTP Seats (contested)	11	  2	10	12	  35	  13	  19
SV or AV Seats	14	  2	12	16	  44	  16	  23
SV Seats (contested)	  8	  2	12	13	  35	  20	  29
List PR Seats (based on 1st candidate)	15	  4	12	13	  44	  11	  16
AMS Seats (based on 1st candidate)	13	 7	13	11	  44	   3	    5 








Independents were the leading ‘party’ in terms of vote shares in 1991, but the Liberal Democrats upped their vote share greatly in 1995, as did the Tories a little, both at the Independents’ expense. In the first election Independents initially had majority control under FPTP, gaining over two thirds of seats in 1991, and holding many seats through uncontested elections. But by 1995 Independents fell back to controlling two fifths of seats, creating a hung council. SV or AV would have made little difference, shifting two seats from the Tories to Labour in the first election, and one from the Tories to Independents in 1995. Both List PR and AMS would have cut down the Independents’ seats and assigned more councillors to Labour. In 1991 List PR would have kept the Independents in a majority, but AMS would have created a narrowly hung council. Both systems would have given a fairly even four-way split of councillors in a hung council in 1995.

West Somerset1991	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Ind	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total votes) %	13.8	24.9	8.5	52.7	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	18.9	28.6	7.1	45.3	100		
FPTP Seats (total)	  5	  3	1	23	  32	 27	 49
FPTP Seats (contested)	  2	  3	1	14	  20	 25	 45
SV or AV Seats	  3 	  5	1	23	  32	 27	 49
SV Seats (contested)	  0	  5	1	14	  20	 25	 45
List PR Seats	  4	  5	2	21	  32	 13	 27
List PR(based on  1st candidate)	  5	  8	1	18	  32	 11	 20
AMS (53:47) seats	  9 	  5 	8	10	  32	 32	 65









West Somerset 1995	Con	Lab	Lib Dem	Ind	TOT	DV	Adjusted DV
Votes (based on total) %	22.5	33.8	19.8	23.9	100		
Votes (based on 1st candidate) %	21.7	27.5	19.5	31.4	100		
FPTP Seats	  9	  8	  2	13	  32	 16	  23
FPTP Seats (contested)	  6	  7	  2	  8	  23	 11	  16
SV or AV Seats	  8	  9	  1	14	  32	 16	  24
SV Seats (contested)	  5	  8	  1	  9	  23	 15	  22
List PR Seats (based on total) 	  7	  9	  5	11	  32	 11	  16
List PR(based on 1st candidate)	  9	  7	  5	11	  32	 10	  14
AMS (53:47) (based on 1st candidate) seats	  7	  8	  7	 10	  32	   3	    4
AMS (53:47) seats	  8	  9	  6	  9	  32	   7	  10
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